Yuyun Wahyuningrum
Representative of Indonesia to ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (2019-2024); Senior Fellow for Atrocity Prevention and Southeast Asia, Asia Pacific Center for the Responsibility to Protect
Recent legal actions in Timor-Leste and Indonesia against Myanmar’s military junta may signal a quiet but significant shift in Southeast Asia’s response to mass atrocities. Civil society groups and survivors have turned to domestic courts in both countries, invoking the principle of universal jurisdiction to pursue accountability for alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed under the leadership of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.
These initiatives suggest that court, rather than diplomatic forum alone, may increasingly become arenas for confronting grave human rights violations in the region.
Universal jurisdiction rests on a simple premise: certain crimes are so serious that they concern the international community as a whole. Because of this, any state may prosecute those responsible regardless of where the crimes occurred or their nationality of those involved. Unlike traditional criminal jurisdiction, which depends on territorial links or nationality, universal jurisdiction allows domestic courts to pursue perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture and enforced disappearances even when such crimes take place elsewhere.
In practice, the doctrine functions as a legal safety net. When the state where atrocities occur is unwilling or unable to investigate them, often because state authorities themselves are implicated, then another jurisdiction may step in. For victims of mass violence, this principle can provide one of the few remaining pathways to justice.
The doctrine’s legitimacy has been shaped by several landmark cases. The 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel affirmed that crimes against humanity are offenses against the international community, allowing national courts to prosecute them. Decades later, the arrest of Chile’s former dictator Augusto Pinochet in London reshaped debates over immunity when the United Kingdom’s House of Lords ruled that torture could not be considered a legitimate act of state. Senegal’s prosecution of former Chadian president Hissène Habré in 2016 further demonstrated that regional courts can pursue accountability for international crimes.
Such precedents illustrate how domestic courts can complement international tribunals, particularly when political constraints limit global accountability mechanisms.
Against this backdrop, developments in Timor-Leste and Indonesia carry particular significance for Southeast Asia. In January 2026, the Chin Human Rights Organization submitted a criminal complaint to the public prosecutor in Dili accusing senior leaders of Myanmar’s military junta, including min Aung Hlaing, of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The complaint documents extensive airstrikes, and attacks on civilian communities in Chin State since 2022.
Timor Leste’s legal system permits the exercise of universal jurisdiction under its 2009 penal code, which incorporates provisions aligned with the Rome Statute of the international Criminal Court. Prosecutors in Dili have begun reviewing the evidence submitted by civil society groups.
Indonesia has also entered new legal territory. In April 2026, a separate complaint was filed in Jakarta accusing Min Aung Hlaing of genocide against the Rohingya people. The case relies on Indonesia’s new criminal code (Law No.1 of 2023), which came into force earlier this year and includes provisions allowing the prosecution of serious international crimes under universal jurisdiction.
The complaint was submitted by a coalition of activists that includes Rohingya genocide survivor Yasmin Ullah and former Indonesia’s attorney general, Marzuki Darusman, who previously chaired the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar. If pursued, the case could become one of the most consequential uses of universal jurisdiction in Asia.
These legal initiatives have already generated diplomatic repercussions. Myanmar’s junta expelled Timor-Leste’s charge d’affaires from Yangon in February, denouncing the case as interference in its internal affairs. The reaction reflects the junta’s concern that judicial scrutiny could deepen its international isolation.
For Indonesia, the situation is more delicate. As Southeast Asia’s largest democracy and host of the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta occupies a central role in regional diplomacy. Legal proceedings against the leader of a neighboring state inevitably complicate diplomatic engagement.
In this context, universal jurisdiction offers an alternative pathway to accountability. Instead of relying solely on collective diplomacy, individual states can use their domestic legal systems to address grave international crimes and reshape how those norms operate in practice.
The road ahead, however, remains uncertain. Universal jurisdiction cased are complex and often slow. Prosecutors must rely on refugee testimony, satellite imagery and documentation from international investigators, while gathering admissible evidence from inside Myanmar remains extremely difficult.
Another challenge concerns the presence of the accused. Indonesia generally adopts a cautious approach to universal jurisdiction, meaning prosecutions are likely to require the physical presence suspects within its territory before trials can proceeds. If Min Aung Hlaing never travels to jurisdictions willing to arrest him, proceedings may remain stalled at the investigative stage. Questions of immunity may also arise if the junta leader seeks to invoke protections traditionally afforded to heads of state.
Timor-Leste appears more willing to explore universal jurisdiction even when suspects are not present in the country. Its past experience with the Special Panels for Serious Crimes demonstrated a willingness to pursue accountability even when many suspects remained outside its jurisdiction.
Despite these challenges, the significance of these cases extends beyond the courtroom. They demonstrate how victims, civil society groups and legal advocates can mobilize domestic courts to challenge impunity when traditional diplomacy falters.
More broadly they reflect a gradual shift in Southeast Asia’s legal and political landscape. As more states incorporate international crimes into domestic legislation, the prospects for regional accountability may expand.
Ultimately, the legal actions unfolding in Dili and Jakarta challenge the long-standing assumption that sovereignty must always outweigh justice, suggesting that accountability across borders may increasingly become part of Southeast Asia’s political vocabulary.
April 2026
